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Resumen 
La corrupción es uno de los fenómenos criminales que más preocupan a las sociedades contemporáneas. 
Este artículo analiza los vínculos entre los procesos de corrupción y el crimen organizado en España, abor-
dando los mecanismos de infiltración e intercambio de redes criminales en las instituciones públicas. Con 
este fin, el concepto de corrupción y crimen organizado se explicará desde una doble perspectiva política 
y criminológica, así como el impacto en los procesos de toma de decisiones y la percepción social de estos 
temas. España, en las últimas décadas, ha experimentado un ascenso de la corrupción, especialmente en 
el ámbito de la política, como así atestigua el incremento exponencial de casos investigados por la Fiscalía 
Especial Anticorrupción. Realidad, que ha despertado la preocupación ante la configuración de un esce-
nario político proclive a la corrupción, que genera un efecto de atracción para la criminalidad organizada 
ante la vulnerabilidad institucional del sistema político y la Administración Pública, ante el ejercicio de 
prácticas corruptas. Escenario, que ha sido objeto de análisis y cuya radiografía se expone en este trabajo.
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Abstract
Corruption is one of the criminal phenomena that most concern contemporary societies. This article ana-
lyzes the links between the processes of corruption and organized crime in Spain, addressing the mechanisms 
of infiltration and exchange of criminal networks in public institutions. To this end, the concept of corrup-
tion and organized crime will be explained from a dual political and criminological perspective, as well as the 
impact on the decision-making processes and the social perception of these issues. Spain, in recent decades, 
has experienced a rise in corruption, especially in the field of politics, as evidenced by the exponential increase 
in cases investigated by the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. Reality, which has raised concerns about the 
configuration of a political scenario prone to corruption, which generates an attractive effect for organized 
crime in the face of the institutional vulnerability of the political system and the Public Administration, in 
1 This article is linked to research project DER2016-79705-R entitled “Terrorism, organized crime and criminal res-
ponsibility of legal entities: the triad of transnational organized crime”, financed by Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness, as well as research group of “Public policies, international security and global governance” belonging 
to European University.
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the face of the practice of corrupt practices. Scenario, 
which has been the subject of analysis and whose radi-
ography is exposed in this work.
Keywords: Corruption, Spain, organized crime, de-
mocracy
Introduction
One of the first academic difficulties encoun-
ter when seeking to analyze the phenomenon 
corruption is to find a precise, actually, defini-
tion of ‘corruption’. While our first reflections 
may come from a moralistic perspective, it is 
important to emphasize not only the causes, 
types of crime and the social impact corrup-
tion, but also its impact on democratic sys-
tems.  Indeed, while it is clear that corruption 
scandals cause significant damage to the dem-
ocratic conscience of a society, it is the contin-
ued feeling of impunity which someone may 
enjoy, that is more harmful. 
At present, crimes of corruption in Spain, 
or rather, the knowledge we have of them 
thanks to mass media, have increased signifi-
cantly. However, it is important to differenti-
ate between corruption and organized crime 
because these two concepts can lead to con-
fusion, in that corruption is usually seen to 
be a part of organized crime, and yet, from 
the State’s point of view, where these acts take 
place have important conceptual differences.
In this article, we analyze public corrup-
tion in Spain, identified as one of the great 
social problems we face today. To do this, we 
examine the permeability between the pro-
cesses of corruption in private institutions 
and public authorities. This will in turn allow 
us to delve into the degree of involvement of 
organized crime groups in corruption and 
to elucidate, if it is the main cause or if, on 
the contrary, the problems of corruption are 
essentially political due to its links with eco-
nomic-business crime.
Organized crime, corruption and 
Spanish democracy
The Spanish National Security Strategy of 
2017 (forward SNSS) identifies, in its Chap-
ter IV, entitled “Threats and challenges to 
national security”, the organized crime as a 
threat, characterized by its transnational na-
ture, opacity, flexibility, adaptability and re-
covery, as well as its mobility. 
Organized crime destabilizes the politi-
cal and economic structures of States and, in 
turn, encourages vicious circles of insecurity, 
insofar as members of criminal networks can 
collaborate with corrupt governments, para-
military organizations or terrorist groups. For 
this reason, organized crime generates and ac-
tivates other risks and threats - mainly money 
laundering - that contribute to weakening the 
state, hampering economic growth and un-
dermining democracy. 
In addition, and independently of the im-
pact on the economy activities, such as piracy, 
drugs trafficking, weapons and human traffics, 
or the attempts of these criminal acts against 
Human Rights, it is becoming clear that the 
links between criminal groups and terrorist 
organizations are closer. This connection adds 
danger to the phenomenon.4
4 Concern, which led in 2014 to the decision taken by the 
Council of Ministers, to approve the Royal Decree amend-
ing the basic organizational structure of our Home Affairs 
Ministry, through the creation of the Intelligence Center 
against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO), as a 
new general deputy directorate, under the Secretariat of 
State for Security, through the integration of the National 
Center for Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNCA) 
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Similarly, SNSS predicts that organized 
crime will increase in volume, scope and 
benefits, mainly through the exploitation of 
new markets in regions of accelerated eco-
nomic growth. Spain is one of the European 
countries in which the incidence of organized 
crime will be more significant, identifying the 
national territory as an objective, to try to im-
plant its structures and penetrate the various 
levels of the national administration and busi-
ness circles. 
In conclusion, the level of threat is cata-
loged as serious, real and direct for Spanish 
interests and for National Security in the po-
litical, economic, social issues and in the pro-
tection of the rule of law (Spanish National 
Security Strategy 2013).
Regardless of what is established in our 
national strategy, currently, at the national 
level, different perceptions of organized crime 
are converged, which do not always share the 
same vision about its defining characteristics 
and relevance. 
In broad outline, it is possible to identify 
an academic view, where the contributions of 
the criminological doctrine and those of the 
criminal legal doctrine do not end up consen-
sual a univocal view of the phenomenon and, 
even less, shared. 
On the other hand, the perception from 
the Security Forces, which in turn establish 
differences between “organized delinquency” 
and “organized crime”, according to criteria 
of danger and damage (impact), are based on 
analytical considerations concerning high or 
low intensity. A conceptual challenge, which 
will require patience and multidisciplinary 
studies, to settle this totum revolutum in favor 
and the Center for Intelligence against Organized Crime 
(CICO).
of a unique, agglutinative and shared percep-
tion and definition of organized crime and its 
characteristics at national level.
Nonetheless, the lack of harmonization in 
definitions has not been an obstacle to devel-
opment the political and legal area in the fight 
against organized crime in Spain. As a result of 
several factors, with the aim of harmonizing 
procedural and penal law to deal with trans-
national organized crime, a new criminaliza-
tion of criminal organizations and groups, has 
recently been introduced into our Penal Code 
(López-Muñoz 2015, 42). Typification is lo-
cated within the crime against public order5. 
In fact, the importance of this decision is due 
to the fact that, until the enactment of LO 
5/2010, Spanish criminal law did not include a 
concept of organized crime. Moreover, through 
the jurisprudence of our Supreme Court and 
the indications of the State Attorney General, 
a criminological perspective was recognized 
that allowed the criminal organization to be 
understood as “the concentration of efforts to 
achieve a criminal purpose, which by its own 
nature needs a structural fabric, which makes 
indispensable an orderly and pre-established 
collaboration between several people”.6
The reform has introduced the criminal 
definition of delictive structure and, in this 
sense, our Penal Code defines as “criminal or-
ganization” the grouping formed by more than 
two people with a stable or indefinite character, 
that, in a concerted and coordinated manner, 
are distributed tasks or functions, in order to 
commit crimes. Despite the transcendence of 
legal innovation, it is part of the strange doc-
trine (López-Muñoz 2015, 55-56) that the leg-
islator has not also defined, as has already been 
5  Organic Law 5/2010 of June 22.
6 Office of the Attorney General of the State. Circular 
2/2005, Section I.2.
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done in Italy, the modus vivendi of these orga-
nizations: The “mafia method” that exemplifies 
its habitual behaviors7 , such as to use its posi-
tion of strength and intimidating potential that 
provides its solidity as an organization, favor-
ing compliance with its commercial, economic 
and political, or other pretensions (extortion), 
on the basis of fear (intimidation), in order to 
satisfy the criminal strategy drawn, be it lawful 
or illicit, without necessarily resorting to the 
use of violence. All of this, under the silence 
emanated by the fear of retaliation or revenge 
(Cuenca García 2012).
On the other hand, elements such as the 
pyramidal, hierarchical or network character 
of the organizational structure, the use or not 
of important and especially suitable means to 
achieve the aim pursued, or the fungibility of 
its members, do not appear as demands by the 
legislator (Velasco 2011, 250).
The legal definition closes the art. 570 bis 
of the Spanish Penal Code, which refers to the 
potential harm to the organization on the ba-
sis of high numbers of members, the supply 
of weapons or dangerous instruments and the 
provision of technological means to facilitate 
implementation or its impunity.
A priori gives the impression that the Span-
ish Legislator has roughly understood that 
organized criminal phenomenon, organized 
big criminality, possesses means, techniques, 
capacities, tactics and procedures capable of 
7 Italian Penal Code, art. 416-bis: Mafia is an ilicit type of 
association which are part of  the intimidating force, the as-
sociative bond and the conditions of submission and omertá 
(conspiracy of silence), that derive from it to commit crimes, 
to acquire directly or indirectly the management or in any 
case the control of economic activities, concessions, authori-
zations, contracts and public services or to obtain, for itself 
or for other, unfair benefits or advantages, or in order to 
prevent or impede the free exercise of the vote or of seeking 
votes for themselves or for others, on the occasion of elec-
toral consultations.
constituting a qualitatively and quantitatively 
greater and more important threat (Sansó-
Rubert and Giménez-Salinas 2014, López-
Muñoz 2015). This is not the case, however.
In favor, highlight the characteristic of the 
new regulation; On the one hand, its appli-
cation to criminal organizations operating in 
Spain, even if they have incorporated or de-
velop part of their activity abroad (Carretero 
Sánchez 2011). So, art. 570 ter, maintains 
that “for the purposes of this Code, a criminal 
group means the union of two or more per-
sons who, without meeting any or some of the 
characteristics of the criminal organization”, 
defined in the previous article, “by purpose or 
object the concerted perpetration of crimes”. 
The legislator has wanted to capture those 
criminal forms that, without fully embracing 
the model of criminal organizations, are wor-
thy of a plus of danger. Consequently, with 
respect to the concept of organized crime, 
two figures are introduced: organization and 
criminal group.
The preamble of LO 5/2010 justifies dif-
ferentiation on the basis that the criminaliza-
tion of the criminal group being a response to 
other phenomena similar to criminal organi-
zations widespread society, which are extreme-
ly dangerous and violent but do not meet the 
structural requirements. In short, they are 
forms of criminal agreement, which do not fit 
into the archetype of criminal organizations 
but provide an extra criminal danger to their 
activities and in relation to its members. 
Criminal groups own all the characteristics 
of organizations except the stable character or 
vocation of permanence over time. A some-
what basic form of ordering the diversity of 
organized criminal manifestations covered by 
the lax definition of the 2000 United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized 
109
Corrupción en la democracia española            Julia Pulido-Gragera y Daniel Sansó-Rubert Pascual
URVIO, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad No. 26 • enero-abril 2020 • pp.105-122
ISSN 1390-4299 (en línea) y 1390-3691 
Crime, which, as already stated, unsatisfac-
torily terminated the doctrinal debate on the 
definition of organized crime.
Thus, the Spanish legislator has established 
two large groups based on the difference be-
tween those criminal structures, that represent 
an attack on citizen security and Public order 
(criminal groups), of those other structures that, 
truly, threaten the sovereignty and independence 
of the State (criminal organizations) (Sansó-Ru-
bert 2015). In addition to the criminal organiza-
tion, the transnationality of its action denotes a 
plus of gravity with respect to a common crimi-
nal group. Therefore, it must be important to 
fill in what is understood and identified, by each 
of the criminal concepts cited, beyond the mere 
legal definition established.
This evaluation has been sterile since it is 
a relative comparison, rather the need to es-
tablish a list of crimes specific to transnational 
organized crime (Zúñiga 2016). Another as-
pect that has been discussed in relation to the 
organized crime, is its link with the phenome-
non of corruption and how it is used, either as 
a methodology of action, or as a pre-existing 
structural condition to exploit favorably, for 
the achievement of its criminal objectives.
How do we differentiate between crime 
and corruption? If we focus on their differ-
ent activities, perhaps the differences become 
clearer. It is obvious that the final aim of both 
phenomena is to make a profit and their ex-
istence depends on the profitability of the il-
legal activity that is being carried out. While 
there is no accepted definition of organized 
crime among academics, there is agreement 
on what constitutes organized crime.
The creation of an organization with con-
tinuity over time, whose objectives are to ra-
tionally acquire a number of benefits through 
force and/or threats or specific actions in the 
field of corruption (Albanese 1995). There-
fore, it follows that corrupt acts can be used 
by organized crime groups as instruments, in 
order to avoid the consequences of punish-
able actions although sometimes the durabil-
ity over time of corrupt processes and pun-
ishable acts derives from them. This raises the 
question of the suitability of cataloguing this 
crime, corruption, as something akin to the 
usual acts of an organized criminal group.
Corruption is perhaps easier to define. 
Numerous definitions are existed, based on 
moral, legal, sociological and political points 
of view. Bejarano (1997) defines corruption, 
as changing the nature of something, in other 
words, perverting it. Simonetti (1996) adds 
an individual-moralistic perspective, by stat-
ing that corruption is “the influence that an 
individual can have over another in order to 
provoke an internal transformation”. But fun-
damentally, the element that characterizes cor-
ruption is its connection with the exercise of 
power both in the private and public spheres. 
Although those acts of corruption that 
have the greatest impact are those relating to 
the government, it would be inaccurate to ig-
nore those relating to the private sector (Ball-
esteros 2019a). Therefore, it is important to 
make this distinction and accept coexistence 
of corrupt acts in two spheres. 
With respect to whether democratic devel-
opment in Spain has influenced the phenom-
ena of corruption, it is true that we cannot 
identify the democratic youth of Spain as a 
single factor, but a series of feedback issues 
that have favored the publicity of a series of 
corrupt acts (Lapuente 2016).
Claim that if the crisis of institutional val-
ues has been the motive or the consequence of 
the phenomena of corruption, that in the last 
fifteen years have ravaged our country, is to be 
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prove. What is clear is that all of this had been 
prepared by the economic crisis, which had a 
particularly violent impact on Spain.
In this sense, in democratic terms, the ex-
tension of political corruption to all spheres of 
Spanish political organization, has provoked a 
“clear erosion of the confidence of the citizens 
in the institutions of the State which produces 
a generalized crisis of confidence and citizen 
uncertainty that can have important effects on 
the Spanish democratic system and the actors 
involved” (Jiménez 2015).
In this sense, there is an evolution in the 
perception of democracy in Spain. The absence 
of an alternative regime in the first democratic 
decades in the country, supposed a majority ap-
proval of the system (Montero 1992).
In this sense, we cannot provide a con-
cise definition of democracy in Spain, but 
the conceptualization of the term, is given by 
the measurement of the quality of democracy, 
which will depend on multiple factors includ-
ing legitimacy, Government effectiveness, the 
functioning of the rule of law, the representa-
tiveness of collectives, the international per-
ception of democracy, political participation, 
among others (Gómez Fortes et al. 2010).
The democratic system does not be ques-
tioned at present. What is questioned is the 
management of the same, on the side of the 
political actors. In this sense, the social de-
mand for greater transparency in the public 
sphere is increasingly recurrent, which will 
contribute in a more effective way to reduce 
the processes of political and administrative 
corruption in our country (Güemes 2018).
The institutional legacy received by the 
1978 constitutional system is a heavy bur-
den. Despite the great advances made by the 
current constitutional regime, in relation to 
the years of Franco’s dictatorship, it was not 
possible to break the mold (Acemoglou and 
Robinson, 2012). The embedded inheritances 
of a model managed from the conception of 
patronage politics as a system, have once again 
sowed strong roots, if ever they disappeared 
(Costa 2005).
The prevailing institutional system suf-
fers from a political patronage that stifles the 
political-institutional life of the country and 
favors the intrusion of organized crime into 
the institutions of the established democratic 
system. The lack of means and effective tools 
capable of immunizing the current democ-
racy, with respect to the practices of nepotism 
and clientelism extended to the dictatorial 
stage, favors its consolidation in the dynam-
ics of government and public management. 
There has been a contamination of the entire 
institutional building in the face of political 
disaffection in eradicating corrupt behavior in 
the management of the public, the result of 
an extended patrimonial conception of power. 
Spain suffers from a permissive social percep-
tion in relation to the culture of favor.
With respect to a definition of corrup-
tion, we leave aside the established between 
individuals, or private corruption (Suther-
land 1983), to focus on the public, political 
or administrative. In this sense, we apply the 
definition taken in art. 2 of the Civil Conven-
tion on Corruption adopted by the Commit-
tee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
4 November 1999. Whereby “corruption is 
understood as the solicitation, offering, giving 
or accepting, directly or indirectly, an unlaw-
ful commission, any other advantage or the 
promise of such advantage affecting the nor-
mal exercise of a function or the required con-
duct of the beneficiary of the unlawful com-
mission, of another undue advantage or of the 
promise of such undue advantage”.
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From this definition, the particularities in 
the case of Spain, will be analyzed in the fol-
lowing sections.
Perceptions of corruption and its 
impact in Spain
Public perception plays a key role in our un-
derstanding of the impact of corruption on 
democratic systems. It is not only about the 
subjective assessment of what corruption is 
and how this is translated into show trials that 
involve those indicted on corruption charges 
and the judicial actors. It also has a direct im-
pact on politics and electoral campaigns.
In general terms, cases of corruption and 
the attention which media gives to these 
events, influence new forms of advertising 
and political visibility (Palau and Devesa 
2013) (Thompson 2001). Today, the effect 
that news about corruption has on civil soci-
ety is an element that political parties consider 
extremely important in the development not 
only of their electoral strategies, but also as a 
weapon in their attack tactics in the conven-
tional political debate.
But, does the average Spanish citizen con-
sider the phenomenon of corruption as an 
ordinary part of political life, or does it have 
truly measurable influence on their vote.  Ji-
ménez and Cainzos (2004) provide six condi-
tions that must be met for a corruption scan-
dal to have an influence on the election result. 
These are:
1. Knowledge about the scandal; 2. Nega-
tive evaluation: knowledge of it has to 
carry potential rejection; 3. Allocation of 
responsibility: the voter has to directly 
or indirectly hold responsible those par-
ticipating in the elections; 4. Allocation 
of relevance: the citizen must position the 
corruption at the top of the hierarchy of 
social concerns; 5. Visualization of an al-
ternative: the voter has to be willing to vote 
for a different candidate or party to the one 
they usually vote; 6. Consistency between 
attitudes and behaviour: the voter must be 
consistent at the time of exercising their 
right to vote with respect to the above con-
ditions (Jiménez and Cainzos 2004).
 If we analyze the Spaniards perception about 
corruption, we can observe that public opin-
ion is more concerned only when the most 
famous corruption scandals come to light. In 
recent years, the acts of corruption that have 
produced a direct negative impact on the per-
ception of Spaniards have been those, which 
have involved relatives of the King of Spain or 
important national politicians.
One of the most worrying developments 
arising from the ongoing public revelations 
of corruption is the matter-of-factly attitude 
with which citizens accept this type of crimi-
nal acts. Getting used to seeing these acts both 
in the newspapers and on TV leads to a blassé 
attitude where nothing surprises anybody 
anymore.
In this regard, Palau and Davesa argue 
“when society is constantly subjected to nega-
tive messages about the political class, the 
scandal is no longer seen as something rare 
and exceptional and becomes instead an en-
demic characteristic of political culture, lead-
ing to the sensation of ‘scandal fatigue’ in some 
citizens” (Palau and Davesa 2013, 98). This is 
due to the permanent and constant appear-
ance of cases of corruption not only in the 
news but also on ad-hoc TV programs or even 
in the so-called tabloid press.
In addition, we must stress that the vol-
ume of cases of acts corruption reported in the 
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media is inversely proportional to the inter-
est and level of education that citizens tend 
to aspire to (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). 
Because of ‘scandal fatigue, the population 
tends to suffer from laziness in seeking basic 
information from political parties about their 
manifestoes. The ignorance on the part of an 
important sector of society about political 
programs, and the number of votes that a giv-
en political party depends on the journalists, 
marketing and communication strategies the 
candidates use during the election campaign. 
Thus, Spanish political and electoral strategies 
are going to be influenced and shaped by the 
number of political scandals come out about 
opposition parties and political rivals.
In fact, Peters and Welch (1978) have ar-
gued that significant differences in the levels 
of electoral sanctions were associated with dif-
ferent models of corruption allegations. This 
fact was decisive in relation to the scale of 
moral values of citizens.
The social impact derived from the per-
ception of moral decadence of a well-known 
politician is not comparable to an act of cor-
ruption committed by a newcomer. For ex-
ample, the negative and surprising impact 
generated in Spain by the alleged corruption 
case involving Rodrigo Rato, former Minister 
of the Economy in the first President govern-
ment José María Aznar, around 1996, was due 
not only to the crime itself, but also because 
of the untarnished image, perceived by many 
citizens, with which he portrayed himself dur-
ing his years in politics.
Moreover, we must also note that the 
multiplier element of economic crises also in-
creases subjectivism and satisfaction or dissat-
isfaction with the political situation and the 
government. Therefore, the social impact will 
also depend on the political-economic situa-
tion that the country is going through at the 
time. We could suggest that the cases of cor-
ruption such as the ones that have appeared 
in recent years in Spain would not have had 
such a negative impact had they been revealed 
during times of economic bonanza.
However, curiously, despite the fact that 
the Spanish once again consider corruption as 
one of the great problems of the country, to 
the point that the number of scandals with 
politicians as protagonists have placed soci-
ety at some point close to the weariness, at 
least in theory. But this maxim cannot even be 
verified in Spain, since here the punishment 
to the corruption in the polls is very limited. 
Corruption seems almost free to the politician 
at the polls and electoral punishment to which 
the suspects are subject is at best very limited. 
In addition, despite the fact that civil society 
has other instruments to exercise a necessary 
control over the political class, these resources 
are in practice underutilized. One possible ex-
planation for this may be the high levels of 
demobilization that characterize Spanish so-
ciety as a whole.
In spite of this imperious need, the con-
tinuous episodes of political corruption have 
undermined the confidence of the citizens, 
not only in politics and politicians, but in the 
democratic system itself, favoring institutional 
detachment and discouragement, thus generat-
ing evident risk of collapse of the rule of law. 
To this circumstance, Villoria Mendieta (2001, 
102; 2006, 278 et seq.) adds as the main cause 
the low civic and participative culture of the 
Spaniards, which he concretes in: his low inter-
est in politics; his sarcastic and cynical vision of 
power; the fact that television is the hegemonic 
means of political information; it´s very low 
levels of political and trade union affiliation 
(last place in Western Europe), its low rates of 
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civic associationism (around 30%, the lowest 
in Europe) and their general distrust towards 
other citizens (above 60%).
To what should be added, in relation to 
the role of organized crime as a factor favoring 
corruption, it is not perceived as a threat, even 
tangible, by the Spanish society.
Society and the main public administra-
tions and government are not aware of the 
real danger of organized crime. The absence 
of the widespread practice of extortion protec-
tion, coupled with the fact that their levels of 
violence have been low enough not to arouse 
the social alarm and, consequently, the frontal 
response of the State. Its social effects, much 
lower than those of other countries, have been 
able to be metabolized without major prob-
lems. All these reasons have led to the Span-
ish citizen not having a clear awareness of the 
danger posed today by organized crime. This 
is why there is no social mobilization in Spain, 
as in other countries such as Italy (for example 
the “Addio Pizzo” movement), where civil so-
ciety and even the Church are very active in 
the fight against organized crime.
Finally, in order to fully understand the 
perception of a corruption scandal, one must 
take into account several factors, the type and 
nature of the scandal, the level of influence of 
the actor or actors accused of the crime, and 
finally, the political-economic situation at the 
moment the criminal act is made public
Corruption in Spain 
It is not something new to affirm that the 
prevention of corruption offenses is of the 
utmost importance for the Spanish demo-
cratic system. In the last decades the scandals, 
some proven and others alleged, have had a 
profound effect on the political agenda of our 
country.
It is essential to delimit conceptually what 
is meant in Spain by corruption. We can find 
definitions from many different perspectives, 
but we believe it is important to start this 
analysis from a legal point of view. So “cor-
ruption would be any action or omission on 
the part of a public actor who violates legal 
norms and the duties of his position, with 
abuse of power and with the purpose of ob-
taining private or personal benefits for him-
self/herself or for the group that he/she is a 
part of ” (Villoria 2014).
From a legal point of view there are two 
areas of law through which acts of corruption 
can be punishable: from a criminal point of 
view, and secondly, from an administrative ap-
proach (Villoria 2014). When the incidence 
of such acts does not reach the sufficient lev-
els of severity and impact on the good order 
and community government with a resulting 
institutional disrepute, then an administrative 
sanction would be the result. (Villoria 2014) 
But we must also keep in mind that not all 
sanctionable conducts must be considered 
corrupt (Villoria 2014). Moreover, Heiden-
heimer, Johnson and V.T. Levine (1989) leads 
us to consider three types of corruption based 
on a moral-collective element (black, grey and 
white) that is determined by the acceptance 
and conviction of the moral elite of the coun-
try and public opinion. In this regard, what is 
considered corruption is going to depend on 
each State, so an act that in our country might 
be considered corrupt, in another country 
could be seen as part of its idiosyncrasy de-
rived from its social and political structure. 
One example is that of the “kickbacks” in 
Latin American countries, which are consid-
ered as white corruption there but would be 
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considered as deplorable, ethically reprehen-
sible acts in European states.
From an ethical perspective, it is con-
sidered a corrupt act in the public sphere 
when external “goods” are put before internal 
“goods” (Villoria 2014), in other words, when 
a public official abuses his position in the 
public administration to obtain a benefit. Ul-
timately, as Laporta and Álvarez (1997) point 
out, “the inevitable and ultimately irreduct-
ible conduct of corruption is the dishonest 
behaviour of the public actor”.
Therefore, in general terms, the definition 
of Professor Villoria (2006) is the best suited 
to our country. He affirms that corruption is 
considered “an abuse of power, with a direct 
or indirect benefit, to the person who is tak-
ing part in the corrupt act or the groups that 
the person is a part of, being in breach of legal 
rules or ethical standards that a community 
takes as valid, and where the corrupt actor al-
ways puts the private interest before the gen-
eral interest”.
In the field of public corruption, the op-
portunities to begin the process of corruption, 
treating these facts not as mere independent 
actions but as a concatenation of events that 
generate a set of actions that violate the ethi-
cal and legal principles, increase in line with 
the power that the public actor owns and the 
benefits to be gained (Fernández 2014). One 
of the reasons that Caciagli (1996) puts for-
ward to explain the increase of corruption in 
Italy is due to increasing state intervention in 
the economy. In this regard, factors such as 
increased local power, increased free desig-
nation of officials and excessive bureaucracy 
that substantially delays the decision making 
(Fernández 2013).
In addition, corruption affects the grow-
ing professionalization of politics leading to 
the consolidation of a partitocracy (Caciagli 
1996) which results in an increase in internal 
discipline in parties and the configuration of 
phenomena such as groupthink that produce 
deviations in the decision-making process 
(Herrero de Castro 2006).
Generally speaking, from a socioeconom-
ic point of view, the processes of corruption 
have a number of causes amongst which one 
should highlight, first of all, the rapid eco-
nomic growth coupled with the establishment 
of a progressive interventionism covering the 
most important areas of public administra-
tion (Iglesias and Medina 2002), secondly, 
the increase in consumer values, along with a 
growing lack of political ethics, discarding the 
feeling of working for the public good. Third, 
the professionalization of politics from a nar-
cissistic sense, and finally, the low efficiency of 
the regulations established to combat corrupt 
processes (Iglesias and Medina 2002), mainly 
due to the delay in the transposition of many 
European directives to the legislation of our 
country (Fernández, 2014). Let it serve as an 
example Directive 2004/18/CE, which took 
a lot of work to be adapted to our legislative 
corpus.
If we undertake a revision of the last de-
cades in Spain, we see many of these elements 
reproduced in full.
With regard to the situation of our coun-
try in terms of corruption, the growth of the 
partitocracy has contributed to the exponen-
tial increase of the costs and financing of po-
litical parties. In this regard, public-private 
corrupt processes have focused on two issues: 
urban planning and public procurement.
Before delving into these phenomena, we 
must highlight the distinction between po-
litical corruption and administrative corrup-
tion (Heywood 1995a; 1995b; 1997; Villoria 
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2006). First type is developed by political rep-
resentatives, while the second one, is based on 
corrupt acts committed by officials. Accord-
ing to Villoria and Jiménez (2012a), these two 
types of corruption occur in all spheres of the 
Spanish administration, at both national and 
regional or local levels. But despite the fact 
that the coexistence of these two types of cor-
rupt acts is a fact, one of the alarming trends 
these last few years has been the increase in 
political corruption. According to these au-
thors, this is due to the difference between the 
meritocracy involved in the access to the civil 
service system and the arbitrariness in the ap-
pointment of politicians (Villoria and Jimé-
nez 2012b).
Corrupt processes in Spain with regard 
to urban planning policies focus primarily 
on one type of political corruption. Mainly, 
they have their center of gravity in local gov-
ernment (municipalities and town halls) and 
are produced under various variables: on the 
one hand, the principle of local autonomy 
reflected in the Spanish Constitution and re-
ferred to in several judgements made by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court states that “rel-
evant and recognizable competences with re-
gards to urban planning should be conferred 
to municipalities”.8 Moreover, the increase in 
the supply and demand of real state assets and 
housing in the last few years has favoured cor-
rupt practices. The local finance system, urban 
development, the proximity of public officials 
(administrative corruption) to the speculators 
and the reduced effectiveness of contentious-
administrative law has contributed to the rat-
ing and unrating of land being done in many 
situations without a tight control, and this 
8 Sentencia Tribunal Constitucional (de España) 240/2006, 
july 20.
has been used as an extra source of income 
by local authorities (Círculo de Empresarios 
2005).
From a standpoint of crimes established in 
our current Penal Code, the following should 
be noted:
- Bribery. It can be considered as the most 
common criminal offense.
- Influence trafficking
- Perversion of justice
- Violation of secrets
- Embezzlement
- Fraud and extortion
With regard to procurement, it must be 
said that corruption as a result of urban poli-
cies that prevailed during the 90´s and the 
first decade of the 21st century and have been 
regarded as one of the causes of the crisis ex-
perienced in recent years, has suffered a pe-
riod of decline leading to the rise of a type of 
corruption that focuses on the connivance of 
public administration functionaries with the 
private sector (Ballesteros, 2019b).
In the case of Spain, we can disclose a typ-
ification of corruption cases, depending on 
who gets the final benefit. In this sense, we see 
four predominant models:
- First, based on the clientelism of a particu-
lar political party.
- Secondly, the result of collusion between 
officials of the public administration and 
political parties.
- Third, the one corresponding to the col-
lusion between public officials and private 
companies.
- Finally, the result of the relationship be-
tween political parties and companies, 
which entails crimes of illegal financing of 
parties
With regard to the first model, use as an ex-
ample one of the slopes in which the case of 
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corruption in Andalusia is divided, which is 
currently under judicial process and affects 
the Socialist Party of Andalusia. It would be 
the case of the ERE, which consisted of in-
cluding members of the environment of posi-
tions of the socialist party in the procedures 
of the employment regulation files of several 
private companies, reason why they obtained 
an economic amount that did not correspond 
to them (El País 2019).
An example of the second model is the one 
that also affects the Socialist Party of Anda-
lusia, in the second aspect of the case, which 
used the money approved for the training 
courses for unemployed in a fraudulent way, 
earmarking it as a benefit for certain people 
not related to such courses. In this sense, au-
tonomous public and provincial officials au-
thorized and allocated the money for these 
courses without controlling their implemen-
tation, so that most did not get to be taught 
(El País 2019).
As for the third model, we can say that it is 
the one that has more opaque nature, and, at 
the same time, more widespread in our society, 
so we can conclude that it is a structural corrup-
tion at certain levels of the public administra-
tion. Most cases do not reach the media, unless 
a senior official is involved or grants of exorbi-
tant amounts of money are involved. Examples 
of this type of corruption are found in the lev-
els of public administrations in which contracts 
and public tenders are awarded. In this sense, 
bribes, and gifts made by certain companies, to 
officials with decision-making powers in public 
tenders, conclude in favors and favors to these 
companies, favoring the award of such con-
tracts and public work projects.
Finally, in what corresponds to the fourth 
model, it is necessary to detach the case Gür-
tel. In this case of corruption is the Spanish 
Popular Party and related companies that ob-
tained contracts of the public administrations 
that were under the Popular Party government. 
The amounts of money were delivered to party 
charges that, well, destined to finance the same, 
or destined to own benefit of the one that re-
ceived the money within the political group 
(General Council of the Judiciary 2018).
Politics and Corruption
Spain has a serious problem with political 
corruption in general, with organized crime 
becoming increasingly involved in it (Tarín 
2016). It is quite possible that corruption has 
not really increased in comparison to the last 
stages of growth and transition in the coun-
try. What happens is that now it seems the 
corruption-detection mechanisms have im-
proved and corruption cases emerge in abun-
dance, especially, following the creation of 
specialized investigative police units and the 
creation of the specialized anti-corruption 
prosecutors’ office.
Corruption in Spain basically is a com-
bination of a poorly rooted political culture, 
coupled with serious institutional flaws and 
poorly protected risk areas. To make a brief 
exercise in historical retrospect one could say 
that the institutional legacy received by the 
young Spanish democracy is a heavy burden. 
Despite the great advances that current con-
stitutional regime has brought in comparison 
to Franco´s dictatorship, as Acemoglou and 
Robinson (2012) have highlighted, Spain has 
not managed to break the mold.
In order to understand the present situ-
ation of the political model and the institu-
tional system we must emphasize the scourge 
of political patronage, which hampers the 
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political and institutional life of the country. 
Spain suffers from an entrenched culture of 
cronyism and a widespread patrimonial con-
ception of power that accompanies us from 
the pre-democratic era (Costa 2005). A severe 
manifestation of the inexistence of an insti-
tutional state culture, both from those exer-
cising the tasks of political leadership of the 
country (Heclo 2010) as well as the social 
recipients of those policies: political power is 
conceived as a means of sharing privileges or 
positions of power among clienteles, friends, 
family, companies or organizations that help 
build complex and opaque networks. In a sort 
of “plot” or conspiracy can find politicians, 
business people and criminals eager for en-
richment and power, interconnected by facili-
tators, whether law firms, financial advisors 
or property managers that put money, skills 
and political influence at the service of a com-
mon interest that satisfies all parties involved 
(Robles 1996).
Despite the general perception of corrup-
tion that exists, we must stress that experts 
agree that there is no widespread corruption 
in Spain (Transparency International 2016; 
Villoria and Jiménez 2012a); that is, corrup-
tion is not consolidated in a systematic way 
(systemic corruption) in public administra-
tion or amongst functionaries of the State. 
They understand that the corruption tends 
to be rather a corruption of a political nature. 
A corruption that is more likely to develop 
at the regional and local levels because it is 
at these levels of institutional power where 
controls and checks and balances tend to be 
weaker compared to the centralized level. Re-
gional and local authorities have broad powers 
and very considerable resources without hav-
ing an equivalent level of responsibility when 
compared to the centralized level of govern-
ment. They also lack adequate control mecha-
nisms and have therefore become the target of 
criminal penetration.
At this point,  It is suitable to remember 
that several territorial levels of government 
coexist in Spain: the central government, the 
regional public administrations correspond-
ing to the seventeen autonomous regions and 
two autonomous cities, and also under the 
banner of local government, Spain has mu-
nicipalities, county councils, smaller islands 
and metropolitan areas. In turn, each of these 
regional governments has a large public sector 
that comprises a large number of entities with 
a distinct legal status (i.e. Municipal compa-
nies). Legal controls on these entities are laxer 
than those used in higher levels of govern-
ment. And yet, organized crime has found in 
them a gold mine that allows them to hide 
their activities under a veneer of legality, espe-
cially those activities linked to public procure-
ment and the provision of services.
Other niches of vulnerability in public 
administration that organized crime has been 
able to exploit due to the absence of prevention 
and early warning mechanisms have been the 
procurement of public works, embezzlement 
and fraud in relation to financial aid grants 
and public funding (both national funds and 
those arriving from the EU) and the funding 
of political parties favored by deficient legisla-
tion regarding the control of anonymous do-
nations (Holgado 2003). Added to this, one 
finds a professionalized political class that has 
been managing public administration non-
stop since the transition without a genera-
tional replacement, the existence of revolving 
doors between public administration and pri-
vate economic and financial sectors without 
any type of control or restriction, the absence 
of transparency initiatives in legislation and 
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lax parliamentary controls that have gener-
ated an optimal scenario for the development 
of influence on the part of organized crime.
The local level is, without a doubt, the 
Achilles heel of Spanish politics and public 
administration against organized crime. This 
basically derives from the broad powers of 
decision that mayors have. According to data 
obtained from the press, more than 600 Span-
ish municipalities have been investigated for 
corruption scandals (Villoria 2016; 51-52). In 
some communities this reality is overwhelm-
ing; for example, almost 60% of municipali-
ties in Murcia and 40% in the Canary Islands 
have had some sort of corruption scandal 
(Jerez et al. 2012).
The excess of discretionary powers mo-
nopolized by the mayors on highly sensitive is-
sues such as urban issues, represent one of the 
biggest vulnerabilities of our political system 
against organized crime, which, in turn, has led 
to functionaries being corrupted, especially at 
the local level of government. The other most 
vulnerable group in Spain against organized 
crime is the members of the Security Forces, 
especially local police forces (Cabezas 2016). 
This is a corruption that has not been achieved 
through the use of violence or intimidation. 
In Spain, organized crime tends to go largely 
unnoticed, making little use of violence. They 
want Spain to remain a place to do business 
and exchanges, both legal and illegal, so the re-
sort to violence is mainly episodic.
Conclusions
Making a conclusive diagnosis of the nature 
of corruption in Spain, we can say that it is 
largely an idiosyncratic element, systemically 
grasped in some sensitive sectors of society. 
Specifically, in the political and business field 
where it seems that the achievement of the 
ends to achieve success, would justify the use 
of any means. At the same time, although we 
have pointed out the definitions of several 
Spanish authors on the concept of corruption, 
it is true that we are now immersed in the dis-
cussion of whether the current catalog of vari-
ous ethically debatable acts would be part of 
the cast of crimes or corrupt acts.
On the other hand, the political-criminal 
nexus between organized crime and corrupt 
behavior is very focused on the municipal 
sphere, with some significant but limited epi-
sodes in the regional political arena. In Spain, 
unlike other countries such as Italy, it has not 
yet experienced the active presence of mem-
bers of different criminal organizations in the 
highest instances of the public administration 
and the legislative, judicial and especially the 
executive (governmental level). Similarly, the 
presence of organized crime is confined to 
very specific sectors of business (especially 
construction, the services sector in tourist ar-
eas and import and export activities to cam-
ouflage illicit trafficking with Latin America 
and the North of Africa, mainly), but from 
the perspective of infiltration of individuals 
from criminal organizations, there are no di-
rect links of state actors with organized crime 
groups  in entities, such as political parties, ec-
clesiastical institutions, the Catholic Church 
itself, the Armed Forces, the intelligence ser-
vice, and even the Security Forces and Corps 
of the State. Despite of deplorable cases of 
police corruption, we must highlight his high 
standards of institutional integrity and social 
recognition for their labour.
The reality, in which Spain is immersed, 
invites a deep reflection, especially in relation 
to the high levels of political corruption and 
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In the final analysis, if in Spain there is 
much, little or medium political corruption 
linked directly or indirectly to organized 
crime, it remains an unknown fact. The data 
available to us are inaccurate, unless they refer 
to corruption that has been already discov-
ered. Paradoxically, the only thing we know 
exactly is that we will not know its measure. 
Not being considered by society as a threat, 
and only recently by the security institu-
tions, as has already been mentioned due to 
the importance of another menaces like ter-
rorism, the attention and means intended for 
their control and eradication are insufficient. 
It is possible that exits relevant political links 
with various criminal organizations, as well 
as a larger casuistry, which has not yet been 
detected.
What seems to be clear is that, on the one 
hand, organized crime in Spain has managed 
to appear invisible in the eyes of the major-
ity of society, until now. Its strategy of not 
creating social alarm has been successfully. 
And the second, municipal councils and local 
politicians (local level), have not endured the 
onslaught of organized crime, succumbing to 
corruption, which forces them to take a good 
note of it for the future.
It all comes down to an apparatus of the 
State not yet sufficiently prepared to face a 
complex phenomenon like that of organized 
crime and now that the true dimension of 
these groups has been revealed, the Spain has 
to tackle all possible fronts to combat them.
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